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HASTENING HARMONIZATION IN 
EUROPEAN UNION PATENT LAW 
THROUGH A PRELIMINARY  
REFERENCE POWER 
JOSEPH KENNETH YARSKY* 
Abstract: The European Union has struggled for decades to establish a stream-
lined method of uniform patent protection. Its current solution involves both a 
European Patent of Unitary Effect and the implementation of the Unified Patent 
Court to adjudicate patent claims. The current proposal, however, does not elim-
inate the two other routes to patent protection that currently exist: national pa-
tent grants and classical European patents. The existence of three possible routes 
to patent protection could lead to increased fragmentation in the way patents are 
interpreted across the European Union.  Creating a more unified system entails 
both ensuring that the substantive patent law contained in the Unified Patent 
Court Agreement is binding on member states, and giving the newly formed 
Unified Patent Court a preliminary reference power to interpret the substantive 
provisions of the Unified Patent Court Agreement. 
INTRODUCTION 
The first formal patent system was established in Venice, Italy in 
1474.1 Many European states followed Venice’s example as a means of en-
couraging inventors to relocate to their countries.2 Through the trade of 
goods, the desire to protect intellectual property through patent grants slow-
ly spread across Europe.3 Despite the early efforts of Europeans to protect 
the rights of inventors to their inventions, Europe now lags behind the 
world in terms of having a simple, efficient, and economical way to protect 
                                                                                                                           
 * Joseph Kenneth Yarsky is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
 1 L.R. Bradford, Inventing Patents: A Story of Legal and Technical Transfer, 118 W. VA. L. 
REV. 267, 268 (2016). 
 2 See id. 
 3 Id. at 268–70; ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 4–5 (LexisNexis Law Sch. Publ’g Advisory Bd. ed., 6th ed. 
2013). 
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patent rights across the European Union (EU).4 Inventors who wish to pa-
tent their work in Europe face numerous hurdles such as multiple transla-
tion requirements, fee requirements, and inconsistent litigation outcomes in 
different states, often on the same set of facts.5 
In an effort to address this issue, the EU has recently undertaken a 
number of patent reforms.6 Through agreements between fellow member 
states, Europe may finally have a system through which a single patent 
grants protection across nearly all member states.7 Additionally, through the 
establishment of a Unified Patent Court (UPC), member states hope to in-
crease consistency and predictability in the area of patent litigation, where-
by one court system handles the majority of cases involving infringement 
and validity disputes.8 
Part I of this Note examines the history surrounding Europe’s attempts 
to harmonize the patent process, and the EU’s recent effort to create both a 
new European Patent of Unitary Effect (EPUE) and a UPC system. Part II 
analyzes the legal history and recent developments within the realm of pa-
tent law harmonization in the EU. Part III argues that the substantive provi-
sions of the Unified Patent Court Agreement (UPC Agreement) should ap-
ply at the national level, and further, that the newly created UPC should 
possess the ability to receive and respond to preliminary references. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. History of European Harmonization Efforts 
Prior to 1977, the administration and litigation of patent disputes was 
considered an area exclusive to the states.9 During this period, states held sole 
control of the grant of patents to inventors and were singularly responsible for 
hearing cases involving patent infringement.10 Under this system, an inventor 
seeking patent protection was required to file with the national patent office 
of the state in which they sought protection.11 If granted, the inventor had  
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Kevin P. Mahne, A Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court for the European Union: 
An Analysis of Europe’s Long Standing Attempt to Create a Supranational Patent System, 94 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 162, 164, 167–68 (2012). 
 5 Id. at 164, 168; Patrick Coyle, Note, Uniform Patent Litigation in the European Union: An 
Analysis of the Viability of Recent Proposals at Unifying the European Patent Litigation System, 
11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 171, 180 (2012). 
 6 Mahne, supra note 4, at 165. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 189. 
 9 Id. at 166, 173. 
 10Id. at 166–67. 
 11 Id. at 166. 
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protection of his intellectual property right in that state alone.12 In cases of 
patent infringement, the national courts of the state in which the patent was 
held would hear the case.13 
One of the earliest attempts to harmonize patent rights for inventors 
occurred at the Paris Convention of 1884.14 Out of the convention arose the 
notion that a foreign inventor should receive the same patent benefits af-
forded to a national of a particular state.15 As commerce became increasing-
ly international in nature, inventors seeking protection outside of their na-
tion state would file independent applications with each nation in which 
they sought protection.16 In addition to patent applications, infringement 
suits were filed in the state courts where the infringing activity occurred.17 
B. The European Patent Office 
 In a continued effort to streamline the process across Europe, the 
next harmonization attempt resulted in the European Patent Convention 
(EPC), which came into force in 1977.18 Through this treaty, member states 
formed the European Patent Office (EPO).19 In addition to establishing the 
EPO, the EPC sought to unify the requirements and methods used in the 
grant of a patent.20 Pursuant to the EPC, the EPO was tasked with the ad-
ministration of the new European patent.21 Under this system, inventors 
now have two choices in protecting their intellectual property rights.22 They 
can continue to file for patents in each state in which they seek protection, 
or file a single application for a patent with the EPO.23 If an inventor files 
with the EPO, the EPO serves as a central processing center and determines 
whether the invention meets the criteria for grant of a patent.24 A classical 
European patent does not automatically grant protection in all European 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See id. 
 13 Id. at 167. 
 14 Id. at 169–70. 
 15 Id. at 170. 
 16 See Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, 2013 O.J. (C 175) 1; Mahne, supra note 4, at 
166. 
 17 Mahne, supra note 4, at 167. 
 18 See id. at 173. 
 19 Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 4, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199, 259; 
Mahne, supra note 4, at 174. 
 20 See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 19, arts. 52–70. 
 21 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 19, art. 4. 
 22 Mahne, supra note 4, at 166–67. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 167. 
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member states.25 Rather, after the EPO grants a patent, the inventor must 
then file that patent within each state in which they seek protection.26 Many 
states require that this filing be done in the national language of the state 
and charge additional processing fees.27 As a result, translation and adminis-
trative fees make this an expensive process for the holder of a classical Eu-
ropean patent.28 
Although the EPO is responsible for processing patent applications, it 
does not handle infringement actions based on the patents it grants.29 Mat-
ters of infringement must be litigated in the nation state in which the in-
fringing activity occurs.30 Additionally, challenges to the validity of a patent 
may also be brought at a national level.31 The authority of national courts to 
hear cases of validity and infringement leads to inconsistent results among 
states and uncertainty when an inventor seeks to protect her intellectual 
property rights.32  
C. The European Patent of Unitary Effect 
Recognizing the continued fragmentation of the European patent sys-
tem, the EU utilized enhanced cooperation to pass two regulations in De-
cember 2012, which created a EPUE and a translation regime for the 
EPUE.33 Enhanced cooperation allows EU states to form treaties amongst 
themselves in areas where the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) would otherwise require unanimity.34 Enhanced cooperation 
was necessary because Spain and Italy resisted attempts to harmonize the 
patent process due to a disagreement over the translation requirements for 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Stacey J. Farmer & Martin Grund, Revision of the European Patent Convention & Poten-
tial Impact on European Patent Practice, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 419, 423 (2008); see Frank Peterreins & 
John Pegram, How the EU’s New Unitary Patent System Will Work, LAW360 (Dec. 19, 2012, 1:24 
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/401415/how-the-eu-s-new-unitary-patent-system-will-work 
[https://perma.cc/J56L-SGH8]. 
 26 See Kevin Casey, The European Patent “Situation,” 9 DEL. L. REV. 107, 108 (2007). 
 27 Peterreins & Pegram, supra note 25. 
 28 See Case C-147/13, Spain v. Council, 2015 E.C.R. 299 ¶¶ 35–36. 
 29 Mahne, supra note 4, at 167. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id.; Coyle, supra note 5, at 180. 
 32 Fiona Nicolson et al., Europe’s New Patent Regime—Preparing the Ground, 50 LES 
NOUVELLES 63, 64 (2015). 
 33 Council Regulation 1260/2012 of Dec. 17, 2012, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in 
the Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection with Regard to the Applicable Translation 
Arrangements, 2012 O.J. (L 361) 89, 89, 92; Council Regulation 1257/2012 of Dec. 17, 2012, 
Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, 
2012 O.J. (L 361) 1, 1. 
 34 Mahne, supra note 4, at 184–85. 
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the EPUE.35 The EPUE allows an inventor to file an application with the EPO 
and, if granted, automatically gives the inventor protection in all nations that 
are members of the Unified Patent Court Agreement (UPC Agreement).36 The 
EPUE does not replace the classical European patent, however, nor does it 
replace the nation states’ patent powers.37 Therefore, once the EPUE comes 
into force, an inventor will have three possible routes to securing patent 
protection in Europe.38 
D. The Unified Patent Court 
In addition to the two regulations creating the EPUE and its translation 
scheme, in February 2013 twenty-five EU member states signed the UPC 
Agreement—a treaty that committed the signing states to create a Unified 
Patent Court.39 This attempts to resolve the uncertainty created by the cur-
rent system in which national courts hear all patent disputes.40 In order to 
come into effect, the UPC Agreement must be ratified by at least thirteen 
member states of the EU.41 Of those thirteen, France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom (U.K.)—the “most patent intensive” states—must all ratify 
the agreement.42 Once ratified, the UPC would have exclusive jurisdiction 
to hear matters related to the new EPUE.43 Additionally, it may also hear 
matters related to classical European patents.44 This jurisdiction, however, is 
optional.45 The UPC Agreement allows patent applicants for the classical 
European patent to opt out of UPC jurisdiction for a transitional period of 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Id. at 164–65, 184–85; Mauro Paiano & Ann Critchell-Ward, The Harmonization of Intel-
lectual Property Rights Throughout the European Union, 224 N.J. LAW. MAG. 36, 37 (2003). 
 36 See James Tumbridge, Unified Patent Court: Harmonising Patent Law Throughout Eu-
rope, 15 BUS. L. INT’L 55, 63–64 (2014); Peterreins & Pegram, supra note 25. 
 37 THE SELECT COMM. & THE PREPARATORY COMM., ADMIN. COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN PA-
TENT ORG., AN ENHANCED EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM 1, 9 (2014), https://www.unified-patent-court.
org/sites/default/files/enhanced-european-patent-system.pdf [https://perma.cc/CGU5-UEN7]. 
 38 See id. The European Patent of Unitary Effect is conditioned to enter into force upon the 
entry into force of the Unified Patent Court Agreement (UPC Agreement). See Council Regulation 
1257/2012, supra note 33, art. 18. 
 39 See THE SELECT COMM. & THE PREPARATORY COMM., supra note 37, at 2; Peterreins & 
Pegram, supra note 25. 
 40 Mahne, supra note 4, at 187, 189; Nicolson et al., supra note 32, at 64; Coyle, supra note 5, 
at 180. 
 41 THE SELECT COMM. & THE PREPARATORY COMM., supra note 37, at 19. 
 42 Id. If the United Kingdom does not participate in the UPC Agreement due to Brexit, the 
UPC Agreement requires the next most patent intensive country to ratify. See Agreement on a 
Unified Patent Court, supra note 16, art. 89; discussion infra Section II.D. 
 43 THE SELECT COMM. & THE PREPARATORY COMM., supra note 37, at 9. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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seven years.46 During that time, nationally-granted patents will continue to 
be litigated in national courts.47 
The UPC will consist of three major bodies: a Court of First Instance, 
a Court of Appeals, and a registry.48 The Court of First Instance will have 
three initial locations: a central court in Paris and two subdivisions in Lon-
don and Munich.49 The court in Paris is expected to hear cases involving all 
technologies.50 The London court will hear cases on technologies specifical-
ly surrounding chemistry, human necessities, and metallurgy.51 The Munich 
court is slated to handle technologies surrounding mechanical engineering, 
lighting, heating, weapons, and blasting.52 Cases in these courts will be 
heard by a panel of three judges—two legally qualified judges who are na-
tionals of different states and one technically qualified judge.53 
In addition to establishing the central and regional courts of first in-
stance, under the UPC Agreement member states are permitted to establish 
their own local divisions.54 Cases in these local courts will be heard by a 
panel of three judges.55 The composition of the panel is determined by both 
the location of the court and the nationality of the parties involved.56 In ju-
risdictions where the number of cases heard is under fifty per year, the panel 
will have one judge of the same nationality of the party and two judges of 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id.; Nicolson et al., supra note 32, at 64. 
 47 THE SELECT COMM. & THE PREPARATORY COMM., supra note 37, at 11. 
 48 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, supra note 16, art. 6. 
 49 Id. art. 7; THE SELECT COMM. & THE PREPARATORY COMM., supra note 37, at 12. 
 50 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, supra note 16, art. 7; THE SELECT COMM. & THE 
PREPARATORY COMM., supra note 37, at 12. 
 51 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, supra note 16, art. 7; THE SELECT COMM. & THE 
PREPARATORY COMM., supra note 37, at 12. While the current UPC Agreement specifies London 
as one location for the Court of First Instance, it remains unclear whether and how Brexit will 
impact this choice. See Would Brexit Mean the End of the Unitary Patent and the Unified Patent 
Court?, HGF INTELL. PROP. SPECIALISTS (May 2016), http://www.hgf.com/updates/blog/2016/05/
would-brexit-mean-the-end-of-the-unitary-patent-and-the-unified-patent-court/ [https://perma.cc/
LSP4-KXHJ]; discussion infra Section II.D.  Some commentators believe the UK’s decision to 
ratify the UPC Agreement will allow them to safeguard the London location, while others believe 
Milan may be a more suitable location for the life sciences division of the court. See Jane Croft, 
Milan Challenges London for Patent Court, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.ft.com/
content/9199ea86-80c8-11e6-8e50-8ec15fb462f4/ [https://perma.cc/RPZ9-HARH]; UK to Ratify 
UPC; Lawyers Cautiously Welcome Decision, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV. (Nov. 28, 2016), http://
www.worldipreview.com/news/uk-to-ratify-upc-lawyers-welcome-decision-12654 [https://perma.
cc/RVC8-QQ3S]. 
 52 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, supra note 16, art. 7; THE SELECT COMM. & THE 
PREPARATORY COMM., supra note 37, at 12. 
 53 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, supra note 16, art. 8. 
 54 Id. art. 7. 
 55 Id. art. 8. 
 56 Id. 
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differing nationality.57 In jurisdictions where more than fifty patent cases 
are heard per year, the panel will have two judges who are nationals of the 
country involved and one of a differing nationality.58 The panels will be 
arranged so that at least one judge is not of the nationality involved in the 
suit.59At the appellate level, the judicial panel will be comprised of five 
judges.60 These five judges will include three judges who are nationals of 
differing contracting member states and two judges who are technically 
trained in the science being litigated.61  
The unique composition of the judging panels on the new Courts of 
First Instance and Court of Appeals demonstrate the desire for the uniform 
and competent application of law to the patents at issue.62 This aspiration to 
unify and thereby harmonize patent law across the EU is reflected in the 
history surrounding previous efforts to harmonize patent procurement.63 
The history of previous harmonization efforts is therefore helpful to further 
contextualize the current formulation of the documents that establish the 
UPC and the EPUE.64 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. European Patent Convention 
The EPC helped shape the current harmonization efforts underway in 
Europe.65 Concluded in 1973, the EPC operates as a treaty separate from the 
EU.66 EPC membership is now comprised of all EU states and an additional 
eleven non-EU members.67 The treaty establishes the classical European 
patent.68 Under its framework, once a European patent is granted, the appli-
cant receives a bundle of patents that must be validated in the states in 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. art. 9. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See The Structure of the Unified Patent Court, FRKELLY (Jan. 21, 2015), http://frkelly.com/
structure-unified-patent-court/ [https://perma.cc/W3F2-7VHM]. 
 63 See id.; Coyle, supra note 5, at 172. 
 64 See Coyle, supra note 5, at 172. 
 65 See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 19, art. 142 (allowing for the 
creation of a patent with unitary character); Mahne, supra note 4, at 169; Tumbridge, supra note 
36, at 55; Coyle, supra note 5, at 172. 
 66 Farmer & Grund, supra note 25, at 422, 424; Mauricio Troncoso, European Union Patents: 
A Mission Impossible? An Assessment of the Historical and Current Approaches, 17 MARQ. IN-
TELL. PROP. L. REV. 231, 233 (2013). 
 67 Mahne, supra note 4, at 169. 
 68 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 19, art. 2. 
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which the applicant seeks protection.69 It requires member states to give a 
validated European patent, within their borders, the same rights and privi-
leges as a national patent.70 As such, issues surrounding enforcement and 
litigation of the patent are reserved to the national courts of the state in 
which the patent is held.71 
In addition to the creation of the classical European patent, the EPC 
creates the EPO.72 The EPO is tasked with the duty of processing applica-
tions for the European patent.73 Additionally, the EPC sets the official lan-
guages of the EPO and those of European patent applications.74 An appli-
cant for a European patent must file in one of the three official languages of 
the EPO: English, French, or German.75 If an applicant files in any other 
language, she must provide, in a timely fashion, a translation of her patent 
into one of the official languages of the EPO.76 Should the EPO grant the 
applicant a European patent, the patent must then be validated in each coun-
try in which the applicant seeks patent protection.77 Often, these countries 
require that the applicant translate the patent into the official language of 
the state when validating it.78 A patentee seeking to validate their patent 
across the entirety of the EU faces a cost of approximately €32,000.79 
The EPC also establishes the substantive law governing the EPO’s 
grant of the European patent.80 While this law governs the grant of a patent 
by the EPO, the treaty does not require member states to harmonize their 
patent laws.81 The EPC stipulates that the EPO may award a European pa-
tent in the field of technology if the invention is “new, involve[s] an in-
ventive step and [is] susceptible to industrial application.”82 Subsequent 
articles further define the areas of novelty and industrial application.83 Fi-
                                                                                                                           
 69 Troncoso, supra note 66, at 233–34. 
 70 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 19, art. 2. 
 71 Troncoso, supra note 66, at 234. 
 72 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 19, art. 4; Mahne, supra note 4, at 
174. 
 73 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 19, art. 4. 
 74 Id. art. 14. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Troncoso, supra note 66, at 233–34; Peterreins & Pegram, supra note 25. 
 78 Troncoso, supra note 66, at 234; Peterreins & Pegram, supra note 25. 
 79 EUR. ECON., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE UNITARY PATENT AND UNIFIED PATENT COURT 
1, 12 (2014), http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponot.nsf/0/E788F9A9A95E6F79C1257
CC90055031D/$File/economic_analysis_up_and_upc_04_2014_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TMX-
A8ED]. 
 80 See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 19, arts. 52–70. 
 81 Mahne, supra note 4, at 174. 
 82 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 19, art. 52. 
 83 See id. arts. 54, 57. 
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nally, Article 142 of the EPC encourages members to join to form a unitary 
patent that would have immediate effect across all member states.84 Follow-
ing the completion of the EPC, the Community Patent Convention was 
formed as an attempt to create a unitary patent within the EU.85 Efforts 
failed, largely due to disagreements over the document’s translation re-
quirement.86 In 1999, the EU made further progress towards harmonization 
of the patent system when discussions at the Paris Conference sparked a 
renewed interest in patent harmonization and an examination of the various 
methods to achieve that aim.87 
B. A Bundle of Regulations 
The EU is working towards further standardization of intellectual 
property rights through its establishment of the EPUE and its translation 
requirements, and the UPC.88 The TFEU requires that all decisions regard-
ing intellectual property translation rights be unanimous.89 Spain and Italy, 
however, objected to the proposed translation scheme, which would largely 
mirror the translation requirements in the EPC.90 In an effort to continue 
progress, the European Council (the Council) voted to permit enhanced co-
operation in the area of unitary patent protection.91 Enhanced cooperation 
allows for member states of the EU to coordinate amongst themselves and 
bypass the unanimity requirement.92 
1. Spain and Italy Challenge Enhanced Cooperation 
Following the Council’s decision to implement enhanced cooperation, 
Spain and Italy filed suit with the European Court of Justice (ECJ).93 In 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Id. art. 142. 
 85 Mahne, supra note 4, at 175; Troncoso, supra note 66, at 233; Coyle, supra note 5, at 175–
76. 
 86 See Troncoso, supra note 66, at 234. 
 87 See id. at 235–36. 
 88 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, supra note 16, at 1; Council Regulation 1257/2012, 
supra note 33, at 1; Council Regulation 1260/2012, supra note 33, at 89; Peterreins & Pegram, 
supra note 25. 
 89 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 118, 
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 90 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 19, art. 14; Council Regulation 
1260/2012, supra note 33, art. 3; Mahne, supra note 4, at 164–65. 
 91 Council Decision 2011/167 of Mar. 10, 2011, Authorising Enhanced Cooperation in the 
Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, 2011 O.J. (L 76) 53, 53. 
 92 Mahne, supra note 4, at 184–85. 
 93 Joined Cases C-274/11 & C-295/11, Spain & Italy v. Council, 2013 E.C.R. 240 ¶ 1; Peter-
reins & Pegram, supra note 25. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) adjudicates questions regard-
ing European Union (EU) law. Yvonne N. Gierczyk, Comment, The Evolution of the European 
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Spain and Italy v. Council, Spain and Italy raised five claims against the 
Council, including that the Council lacked the ability to enact enhanced co-
operation, that the use of enhanced cooperation was a misuse of Council 
powers, that the Council breached the requirement that enhanced coopera-
tion be used only as a last resort, and that the Council violated multiple arti-
cles of the founding treaties of the EU and showed a disrespect towards the 
judiciary.94 
Spain first argued that the Council could not give to member states a 
power that it holds exclusive to itself.95 In response to this argument, the 
ECJ observed that Article 118 TFEU referenced an internal market, and that 
previous case law supported the proposition that the internal market is a 
shared power between member states and the Council.96 Therefore, the 
court held that the Council did have the power to delegate to member states 
the ability to establish a harmonized patent system.97 
Italy and Spain also argued that enhanced cooperation was a misuse of 
power that kept them from negotiations and circumvented the unanimity 
required by Article 118 TFEU.98 The court disagreed, holding that Article 
20(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) allows for enhanced coopera-
tion if the EU as a whole is unable to reach its goals unanimously in a rea-
sonable amount of time.99 Additionally, Spain and Italy argued that en-
hanced cooperation should only be used as an option of last resort.100 The 
court nevertheless observed that the current developments had been in pro-
gress for the preceding ten years, and subsequently found that the Council 
was justified in determining it had reached a place of last resort.101  
 Additionally, arguments were raised that the decision to use enhanced 
cooperation constituted infringement of Article 20(1) TEU102 and Articles 
                                                                                                                           
Legal System: The European Court of Justice’s Role in the Harmonization of Law, 12 ILSA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 156 (2005). 
 94 2013 E.C.R. ¶ 9. Because this was a joint opinion from two consolidated cases brought 
independently by Spain and Italy, some arguments were raised by a single party while others were 
raised by both. Id. ¶¶ 7–9. 
 95 Id. ¶ 10. 
 96 Id. ¶¶ 19–21, 25. Article 118 states that, “in the context of the establishment and function-
ing of the internal market, the European Parliament and the Council . . . shall establish measures 
for the creation of European intellectual property rights . . . .” TFEU art. 118. 
 97 2013 E.C.R. ¶¶ 25–26. 
 98 Id. ¶¶ 27–29. 
 99 Id. ¶¶ 36–37. 
 100 Id. ¶ 42. 
 101 Id. ¶¶ 55–56, 59. 
 102 The relevant portion of this article states, “Enhanced cooperation shall aim to further the 
objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its integration process.” Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 20(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 27–28 
[hereinafter TEU]. 
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118, 326,103 and 327104 TFEU.105  Regarding Article 20(1), Spain and Italy 
argued that enhanced cooperation would not lead to increased levels of in-
tegration, but rather, would damage uniformity.106  The court rejected this 
argument, recognizing that the proposed system envisioned uniform protec-
tion across all member states as opposed to the current system of national 
protection.107  It further reasoned that greater uniformity did promote inte-
gration and was therefore in accord with Article 20(1).108   
 Italy then argued that Article 118 requires “Union-wide” protection 
and that enhanced cooperation therefore violates Article 118 by allowing 
certain member states to participate and not others.109  The court rejected 
this argument, recognizing that Article 118—when read in conjunction with 
Article 20(4) TEU—contemplates the permissible use of enhanced coopera-
tion to further unify the EU patent system.110  Spain and Italy further argued 
that enhanced cooperation would undermine the internal market, and there-
fore violate Article 326.111  The court rejected this argument, recognizing 
again that since the action flowed through the use of enhanced cooperation, 
enhanced cooperation would actually serve to strengthen the internal mar-
ket.112  Additionally, Spain argued that enhanced cooperation did not re-
spect Spain and Italy’s rights—in violation of Article 327 TFEU—due to 
the language arrangements adopted by the Council.113  The court again re-
jected this argument, recognizing that nothing in the use of enhanced coop-
eration prejudiced the rights of Italy and Spain.114 
 Spain finally argued that the regulation showed a disregard for the Eu-
ropean judicial system because the regulation failed to articulate what the 
court system would look like.115  The court found this unpersuasive and 
held that the Council was not required to provide information about the 
                                                                                                                           
 103 The relevant portion of this article states, “Such [enhanced] cooperation shall not under-
mine the internal market or economic, social and territorial cohesion.” TFEU art. 326. 
 104 Article 327 states, “Any enhanced cooperation shall respect the competences, rights and 
obligations of those Member States which do not participate in it. Those Member States shall not 
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proposed system in its regulation.116 Therefore, the court dismissed all of 
the challenges that Spain and Italy brought against the Council.117 
2. Regulations Passed Through Enhanced Cooperation 
Following the decision supporting the Council’s authorization of en-
hanced cooperation, the Council passed two regulations in 2012.118 The first, 
Regulation 1257/2012, established the EPUE.119 It also created the unitary 
character of the EPUE, whereby a EPUE grants immediate patent protection 
amongst all members of the enhanced cooperation agreement.120 The EPUE, 
however, does not replace classical European patents or national patents.121 
Furthermore, Regulation 1257/2012 emphasizes that applicants retain the op-
tion to seek a national patent, a European patent, or an EPUE.122 Finally, this 
regulation ties its entry into force to the ratification of the UPC Agreement, 
stating the necessity of the UPC for the proper functioning of the EPUE.123 
The second regulation, Regulation 1260/2012, established the transla-
tion regime of the newly created EPUE.124 In the preamble to this regula-
tion, the Council emphasized the importance of the new EPUE for small 
and medium sized enterprises.125 It stated that the translation scheme should 
“stimulate innovation and should, in particular, benefit small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs).”126 Furthermore, the translation scheme should 
“facilitate access to European patents of unitary effect, in particular for 
SMEs.”127 The regulation stipulates that so long as an applicant files in one 
of the three official languages of the EPO, no further translation require-
ment exists.128 Additionally, the patent holder must translate the patent into 
the language of the alleged infringer upon their request.129 It further directs 
courts to take into account whether the infringement stemmed from a small 
or medium sized enterprise when determining damages.130 The regulation 
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also links its entry into force with the ratification of the UPC Agreement.131 
After the second regulation was passed, Spain again sought to block the 
action through litigation before the ECJ.132 
3. Spain Challenges the Translation Regime 
Following the enactment of EU Regulations 1257/2012 and 1260/2012, 
Spain filed an action with the ECJ arguing that Regulation 1260/2012 
amounted to language discrimination, and raised five pleas against the Coun-
cil.133 In Spain v. Council, Spain argued specifically that the enhanced coop-
eration agreement amounted to a violation of Article 2 TEU, which requires 
the EU to respect linguistic diversity.134 The court found that prior case law 
supported the idea that linguistic diversity does not require all matters of the 
EU to always be available in all languages.135 Rather, the benefit created by 
the lack of linguistic diversity must be proportional to the harm created by 
it.136 The court held that the desire to reduce costs so that small and medium 
sized enterprises could enter the market was a sufficient benefit to permit the 
regulation.137 It dismissed the language discrimination claim and all remain-
ing claims, allowing the regulation to stand.138 
C. The European Court of Justice, the European and Community Patents 
Court, and Subsequent Modifications 
The current UPC Agreement is the result of modifications to a previ-
ous agreement, the European and Community Patents Court.139 The Euro-
pean and Community Patents Court agreement proposed an international 
court system that would give signing member states a common court of ap-
peals similar to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.140 It also 
notably eliminated national courts’ jurisdiction over many patent issues.141 
Furthermore, the agreement stipulated the new court would draw upon 
community law, the EPC, and international agreements as its sources of 
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law.142 Prior to signing the European and Community Patents Court agree-
ment, the Council sought an advisory opinion from the ECJ as to the validi-
ty of the agreement.143 
The ECJ observed that the proposed court was different from other 
courts established by international agreements.144 International courts typi-
cally resolve disputes surrounding the treaty at issue, and do not impact the 
national courts of the members involved.145 The proposed court, however, 
would replace the national courts in patent disputes and become the sole 
communicator with the ECJ on the application of EU law.146 The opinion 
further stated that although the ECJ does not hear the facts of cases, mem-
ber states are not at liberty to relinquish their jurisdiction to resolve disputes 
to an international court.147 In doing so, the court reasoned that the national 
courts would neglect their duty to ensure the proper application of EU 
law.148 Therefore, given its concerns about whether the international court 
would be able to ensure uniform application of EU law, the ECJ found the 
proposed agreement inconsistent with existing treaties on the functioning of 
the EU.149 
In light of the ruling regarding the validity of the European and Com-
munity Patents Court by the ECJ, modifications were necessary in order to 
establish a court that would not violate EU treaties.150 In particular, the 
drafters of the UPC Agreement increased the court’s duty to EU law and 
excluded the participation of any states that were members of the EPC but 
not members of the EU.151 Therefore, the court no longer has its interna-
tional character, but rather, has become a court common to the member 
states of the EU.152 
The revised UPC Agreement specifically requires that the UPC follow 
and respect the primacy of EU law.153 It further notes that the court’s crea-
tion was fostered by a desire to allow small and medium sized enterprises to 
                                                                                                                           
 142 Id. ¶ 9. 
 143 Id. ¶ 1. 
 144 Id. ¶¶ 77–78. 
 145 Id. ¶ 77. 
 146 Id. ¶¶ 78–79. 
 147 Id. ¶ 80. 
 148 Id. ¶ 80; Troncoso, supra note 66, at 242–43. 
 149 Opinion Pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, 2011 E.C.R. ¶¶ 84, 89; Mahne, supra note 4, 
at 165. 
 150 Mahne, supra note 4, at 165, 186; Troncoso, supra note 66, at 243. 
 151 Troncoso, supra note 66, at 243. 
 152 Id.; Peterreins & Pegram, supra note 25. 
 153 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, supra note 16, art. 20; see Mahne, supra note 4, at 
187. 
2017] Hastening Harmonization Through a Preliminary Reference Power 181 
defend themselves against an increasingly fragmented market.154 In order to 
accomplish this aim, the court will handle issues arising under the classical 
European patents as well as the newly created EPUE.155 The UPC Agree-
ment also reiterates that the UPC is bound by the rulings of the ECJ.156 
The UPC Agreement also mandates that the court’s decisions be based 
on EU Regulations 1257/2012 and 1260/2012, the UPC Agreement itself, 
the EPC, applicable international agreements, and national law.157 It defines 
the rights that the patent confers on a patent holder.158 It also defines the 
structure of the court system and the reach of its decisions.159 Under the 
UPC Agreement, decisions on an EPUE will have an effect on the patent 
across all member states, but decisions based on a classical European patent 
will only have effect in the states where the patent has effect.160 
D. The Impact of Brexit on the Unified Patent Court 
On June 23, 2016, the citizens of the U.K. voted to leave the EU in a 
move known colloquially as Brexit.161 Following the Brexit vote, the 
Chairmen of the UPC Preparatory Committee indicated that preparations 
for the UPC would continue.162  Then in November 2016, the U.K. indicat-
ed that they intend to ratify the UPC agreement while they are still a mem-
ber state of the EU.163 Should the U.K. ratify the UPC Agreement prior to 
their departure from the EU, the court could become operational by the sec-
ond half of 2017.164 It remains unclear, however, whether the U.K. will be 
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permitted to continue to participate in the UPC after leaving the EU.165  Some 
legal commentators have suggested that amendments to the UPC Agreement 
or specific terms agreed to in the exit agreement with the EU could determine 
whether the U.K. may continue to participate in the UPC.166 
III. ANALYSIS 
Although the UPC and EPUE have been presented as a means of uni-
fying EU patent law, they could in fact lead to further fragmentation and 
disorder within the European patent system.167 While a fragmented system 
may have its benefits in allowing for flexibility and corporate strategy, fail-
ure to implement further modifications to the patent system will likely lead 
to increased disharmony.168 
A. Fragmentation Under the Proposed System 
The current design of the proposed UPC and the EPUE effectively cre-
ates a system in which forum shopping and increased fragmentation are 
possible.169 Under the proposed system, a patent applicant can choose to file 
either at the national level or with the EPO.170 If the applicant decides to file 
with the EPO she will then have the choice of either seeking a classical Eu-
ropean patent or an EPUE.171 The UPC will eventually have exclusive ju-
risdiction over EPUEs, however, during a seven-year transitional period, the 
UPC will share jurisdiction with national courts over classical European 
patents.172 Furthermore, a European patent holder will have the ability to 
opt out of the jurisdiction of the UPC.173 These choices lead to two systems 
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of obtaining and then defending patent rights.174 If an applicant chooses an 
EPUE, or decides not to opt out of the classical European patent, the patent 
will fall under the jurisdiction of the UPC.175 An applicant who chooses to 
opt out or file at the national level will fall under the jurisdiction of the na-
tional courts applying national law.176 
This system promotes further fragmentation and forum shopping rather 
than increased harmony across the EU.177 Larger corporations seem appre-
hensive as to the legal uncertainties the UPC Agreement creates.178 Addi-
tionally, some experts have suggested that corporations should consider opt-
ing out of the UPC’s jurisdiction or seek national patent protection.179 Given 
the resources at a larger corporation’s disposal, the increased cost of pursu-
ing either of those two options is unlikely to affect the decision regarding 
how to file its patent application.180 Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
appear more optimistic about the UPC, which may encourage them to pur-
sue an EPUE.181 This would relegate them to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the UPC.182 Therefore, at its worst, the proposed model could potentially 
create two systems whereby larger, more sophisticated corporations are able 
to use the national systems to their advantage, while SMEs more frequently 
must rely on the competence of the UPC because of the patenting option 
they chose.183 
The opt-out provision further complicates matters due to uncertainty 
regarding its application.184 The preparatory committee for the UPC has ar-
ticulated that applicants who opt out of the jurisdiction of the UPC will be 
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subject to the national laws of the country in which the litigation is 
brought.185 Nevertheless, it is unclear whether opting out will last only for 
the transitional seven-year period, or through the life of the patent.186 Fur-
ther, it is unclear which law governs in the event that a patentee ops back in 
to the jurisdiction of the UPC after originally opting out.187 This creates 
confusion for the patent holder and potential infringers alike because a pa-
tent that was previously protected under the national patent laws would then 
be subject to the UPC’s set of patent laws.188 
These inconsistencies exist because the UPC Agreement has failed to 
coordinate patent laws among its member states.189 In short, the UPC Agree-
ment does not go far enough in ensuring that members harmonize their patent 
laws so that a single set of principles applies across all member states.190 
B. UPC Agreement as a Vehicle to Harmonize Member  
States’ Patent Law 
During drafting, lawmakers chose to place the substantive patent law 
for the newly created EPUE and UPC in the UPC Agreement rather than in 
the regulations establishing the EPUE.191 This choice reflected concerns 
that placing it in the regulations establishing the EPUE would give the ECJ 
jurisdiction to hear preliminary references from the UPC.192 At the time the 
regulation was considered, the ECJ was experiencing extreme delays in 
judgments due to increased judicial authority.193 The decision to move the 
substantive law to the UPC Agreement has raised questions as to which 
laws should apply to member states.194 This is particularly important when a 
national court decides a case involving a classical European patent during 
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the transitional phase, and when a patentee has opted out of the UPC’s ju-
risdiction.195 The preparatory committee has suggested that a European pa-
tent that has been opted out should be adjudicated under the national laws 
of the state hearing the suit.196 This, however, contradicts both traditional 
applications of treaty law established by the Vienna Convention and the 
actions certain potential signatories to the UPC Agreement have taken.197 
The UPC Agreement is silent on which law applies to a European pa-
tent when a patentee opts out, and on which law governs litigation in na-
tional courts during the transitional period.198 Further, applying national 
patent law while a patent is opted out could result in exposure to two differ-
ent sets of law, as national laws apply while the patent is opted out, and the 
substantive law of the UPC Agreement applies if the patentee opts back 
in.199 In order to truly move towards harmonization of the European patent 
system, national courts hearing decisions on European patents should apply 
the substantive law contained within the UPC Agreement.200 This comports 
with traditional notions surrounding the primacy of treaty law and also cor-
responds to current actions by potential signatories to the UPC Agree-
ment.201 
The Vienna Convention establishes that when a treaty is in force, it is 
binding upon the signatories.202 Furthermore, the internal law of a country 
may not be used as a means to avoid performance of the terms of the trea-
ty.203 Because the UPC Agreement is a treaty, the substantive patent law 
within the treaty should become binding upon those states once they have 
become a party to the UPC Agreement.204 Additionally, the actions of poten-
tial signatories to the document further support the view that the substantive 
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law of the UPC Agreement should be applied within national courts.205 In 
evaluating the UPC Agreement, the U.K. Intellectual Property Office com-
pared the language of the UPC Agreement to the U.K.’s current Patent Act 
and articulated the ways in which the act would need to be amended in or-
der to comport with the new UPC Agreement.206 This practice highlights the 
notion that the substantive law of the UPC Agreement should become na-
tional law upon signing.207 
Customary practices amongst countries further support the notion that 
treaty law is binding upon its signatories.208 For example, prior to signing 
the Uruguay Round Agreement, the United States calculated a patent’s term 
as seventeen years from the date on which the patent was issued.209 The 
Uruguay Round Agreement, however, mandated a patent term of twenty 
years from the date on which the patent was filed.210 In order to comply 
with the treaty language, the United States adopted the Uruguay Round 
Agreement Act, which changed the way patent terms were calculated in the 
United States.211 This example illustrates the practice of harmonizing state 
laws to comply with treaty expectations.212 
Requiring the primacy of the UPC Agreement’s substantive laws 
would promote the harmonization of EU patent law by ensuring that all Eu-
ropean patents, whether litigated before the UPC or in a national court, are 
governed under consistent law.213 Furthermore, it prevents citizens from 
creating exceptions to the power of applicable treaty law based on whether 
they opted out of the jurisdiction of the UPC.214 To further ensure the uni-
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form application of the substantive law contained in the UPC Agreement, a 
mechanism must exist through which this uniformity can be promoted.215 
C. The Promotion of Uniformity Through the Preliminary Reference 
The UPC derives its authority from the UPC Agreement and is there-
fore comparatively similar to other courts established by treaty, such as the 
ECJ.216 Nonetheless, the UPC lacks the ability to receive preliminary refer-
ences and to issue advisory opinions.217 In the wake of Brexit, commentators 
have suggested that a delayed implementation of the UPC may allow for 
amendments to the UPC Agreement.218  Amending the UPC Agreement to 
empower national courts to send preliminary references to the UPC would 
allow national courts to apply UPC substantive law in a similar manner.219  
1. The ECJ as a Model for Preliminary References 
The ECJ was established by international treaty to help harmonize EU 
law across the member states.220 Article 234 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community grants the ECJ power to issue preliminary rulings.221 
Although not utilized in the United States, the preliminary reference proce-
dure is a feature of the EU court system.222 A preliminary reference is issued 
when a national court has a question regarding the application of EU law to 
a particular case.223 The national court stays the case at hand and submits 
the question to the ECJ.224 The ECJ then examines the question and issues 
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its interpretation of the relevant law.225 The national court then uses the an-
swer in order to render a verdict.226 Because the ECJ does not handle specif-
ic facts of cases when rendering a preliminary ruling, it looks solely at the 
proposed question in the context of EU law.227 This allows the national 
court to retain its sovereignty in deciding cases while simultaneously ensur-
ing that a uniform interpretation of EU law is applied in national courts.228 
A preliminary ruling binds the national court that submitted the ques-
tion to the interpretation provided by the ECJ.229 Furthermore, in deciding 
subsequent cases, the national courts of other member states must first look 
to preliminary rulings that touch upon that particular issue.230 They may 
then choose to either apply the ruling to their case, or issue another question 
to the ECJ.231 In this way, the preliminary ruling affects all member states of 
the EU by generating case law that aids in consistent interpretation and ap-
plication of EU law.232 
The ECJ’s power to issue preliminary judgments is the result of the 
fear that member states without guidance could construe EU laws in differ-
ent ways.233 Over time, without a means to correct these varying interpreta-
tions, EU law would be weakened by a lack of synchronization.234 Prelimi-
nary rulings have indeed contributed to the harmonization of EU law.235 The 
European Commission has recognized that the ECJ’s preliminary reference 
power has been an important means of ensuring consistent application of 
EU law through the “dialogue” that occurs between the national courts and 
the ECJ.236 Additionally, increased referrals from the national courts in-
crease existing jurisprudence, which further harmonizes the understanding 
of EU law.237 
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2. Lessons from the ECJ 
Assigning a preliminary reference power to the UPC could facilitate the 
coordination of patent law across member states.238 Similarities between the 
UPC and ECJ suggest that such a preliminary reference procedure could be 
beneficial.239 Both the ECJ and UPC are the result of international agree-
ments that aim to ensure the harmonization of disparate systems of law.240 
Using the ECJ as a model for the UPC could greatly increase the abil-
ity of the UPC to standardize the legal interpretations of patent laws among 
member states.241 Restructuring the UPC Court of Appeals in a way that 
grants it power to receive preliminary references from national courts could 
also facilitate uniform application of UPC law within national courts.242 A 
national court with a question regarding the interpretation of the substantive 
law found in the UPC Agreement could submit a preliminary reference to 
the UPC Court of Appeals in a manner procedurally similar to that of the 
ECJ.243 The court of appeals could then analyze the relevant substantive law 
of the UPC Agreement and return a ruling to the nation state to apply in the 
case at hand.244 Ideally, this would produce an outcome similar to the in-
creased harmonization of EU law under the preliminary reference system of 
the ECJ.245 Preliminary rulings would then bind not only the national court 
that submitted the question, but also subsequent national courts’ rulings on 
the same issue.246 
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D. Benefits of the Proposed Regime 
Concerns regarding the uncertainty, efficiency, and quality of decisions 
of the UPC could all be addressed through the introduction of a preliminary 
reference system.247 Efficiency was a predominant reason why the substan-
tive laws were placed in the UPC Agreement, as this eliminated the possi-
bility that national courts would submit questions to an already backlogged 
ECJ.248 Moving these provisions to the UPC Agreement, however, did not 
provide an adequate means of ensuring uniform interpretation and applica-
tion by national courts.249 Giving the UPC preliminary reference power 
would encourage uniform interpretations of the UPC Agreement provisions, 
while also ensuring that decisions will be rendered efficiently.250 
During the initial years of the UPC, the Court of Appeals will likely 
have a lighter caseload while waiting for appeals from the courts of first 
instance.251 Throughout this time period, preliminary references to the 
Court of Appeals would not become backlogged due to the limited jurisdic-
tion of the court.252 Additionally, allowing the Court of Appeals to issue 
preliminary rulings at the earliest stage of the system’s implementation 
would guarantee that essential questions requiring interpretation of the UPC 
Agreement are resolved as early as possible.253 Given the anticipated light 
caseload during the initial transition period, the UPC would have the ca-
pacity to issue preliminary references more efficiently than the ECJ.254 Ad-
ditionally, the power to issue preliminary references would enable the UPC 
to build case law during the transition period.255 An increased body of  case 
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law would help to hasten the uniformity of UPC rulings.256 Increased uni-
formity would likely encourage larger corporations to make the transition to 
the UPC system, since one of the greatest concerns of larger corporations 
has been the uncertainty the new system creates.257 
Furthermore, a preliminary reference procedure would ensure that in 
the event a patentee opts back in to the UPC system, the patent would re-
ceive the same interpretation of applicable law.258 During the transition pe-
riod it is possible that a patentee will choose to opt out of the jurisdiction of 
the UPC.259 This would leave interpretations of the UPC provisions to the 
national courts.260 Should a patentee opt back in, however, the patent would 
return to the exclusive jurisdiction of the UPC.261 The preliminary reference 
procedure could therefore be employed by national courts when applying 
substantive patent laws to the opted-out patents.262 The UPC’s analysis of 
the treaty language would then be applied by the national courts in render-
ing a judgment on an opted-out patent.263 This would promote a more har-
monious situation should the patentee opt-in and the patents return to the 
jurisdiction of the UPC, because the interpretations of relevant law would 
largely be the same.264 
The Court of Appeals for the UPC will be comprised of judges trained 
specifically in the area of patent law.265 The training will occur under the 
framework of the provisions of the agreement that establishes the court.266 
The Court of Appeals is tasked with interpreting the UPC Agreement when 
deciding cases on appeal.267 Given this power to interpret the substantive 
                                                                                                                           
 256 See Crowley, supra note 189, at 223–24; Gierczyk, supra note 93, at 157. 
 257 See EUR. ECON., supra note 79, at 61; Crowley, supra note 189, at 224; King, supra note 
222, at 723; Miller, supra note 219, at 687. 
 258 See Pinckney, supra note 173, at 274; Letter from Nicholas Forwood, supra note 187; cf. 
King, supra note 222, at 723 (arguing that the ECJ has provided the benefit of legal harmony). 
 259 Peterreins & Pegram, supra note 25. 
 260 Id.; Pinckney, supra note 173, at 274. 
 261 See Pinckney, supra note 173, at 274; Letter from Nicholas Forwood, supra note 187. 
 262 See Letter from Nicholas Forwood, supra note 187; cf. King, supra note 222, at 723 (argu-
ing the ECJ has allowed for the creation of a common understanding of Community law in mem-
ber states). 
 263 Cf. Gierczyk, supra note 93, at 157 (arguing the preliminary reference procedure allowed a 
common understanding of the treaty language to form). 
 264 See Pinckney, supra note 173, at 274; Letter from Nicholas Forwood, supra note 187; cf. 
Gierczyk, supra note 93, at 160 (arguing that rulings of the ECJ apply in situations where similar 
legal questions are raised). 
 265 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, supra note 16, art. 19; Crowley, supra note 189, at 
222. 
 266 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, supra note 16, art. 19. 
 267 Id. arts. 9, 24, 73; THE SELECT COMM. & THE PREPARATORY COMM., supra note 37, at 
18. 
192 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 40:167 
patent law in the UPC Agreement, the Court of Appeals effectively becomes 
the authority on the meaning of the UPC Agreement.268 This expertise pro-
vides a strong justification for providing the Court of Appeals with the 
competence to receive preliminary references from national courts.269 
Finally, allowing the court to receive preliminary references would al-
so address the forum shopping issue that persists under the current frame-
work.270 Just as the use of preliminary references by the ECJ helped to har-
monize EU law over time, a preliminary reference system by the UPC would 
help to clarify the understandings of the substantive patent law promulgated 
by the agreement.271 As nation states begin to apply a consistent interpreta-
tion of the law, the perceived advantages of litigating a case in the UPC or 
national courts should start to diminish, decreasing litigants’ incentive to 
engage in forum shopping.272  Granting the UPC the power to receive and 
respond to preliminary references would therefore provide an efficient 
method of harmonizing the substantive law in the UPC Agreement and de-
creasing the prevalence of forum shopping.273 
CONCLUSION 
The EU has long sought to further harmonize the processes through 
which patentees procure and enforce patents. Although the EPC and EPO 
have positively contributed to the harmonization efforts, further action is 
required. In the latest rounds of legislation and treaty negotiations, it has 
become clear that the EPUE and the UPC present the next steps in creating 
a harmonized patent system across Europe. 
Deficiencies in the drafting of the UPC Agreement and its subsequent 
interpretation across the EU have impeded this progress. In order to truly 
work towards harmonization of the patent laws across member states, the 
UPC Agreement should require that signing states adopt the substantive 
patent law contained within the Agreement as part of their domestic law. 
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This will ensure that patents litigated at the national level receive the same 
treatment as those litigated through the newly formed UPC. 
Additionally, the UPC should be granted a preliminary reference pow-
er in order to ensure that state courts deciding cases under the language of 
the UPC Agreement apply a more uniform interpretation. An ability to issue 
preliminary references would also discourage forum shopping by eliminat-
ing the advantages that occur through disparate interpretations of the sub-
stantive patent provisions. An increasingly harmonized EU patent law is 
necessary for improved innovation across the EU, but the current legal ef-
forts to stimulate such change do not go far enough to bring that vision into 
reality. 
